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HOME-OWNERS, RENTERS, AND BUREAUCRATS: 
A REDISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF MUNICIPAL INCORPORATION 
Gary J. Miller 
What are the reasons why a newly developed urban area 
might choose to incorporate as a separate municipality rather than 
be annexed to a neighboring city? The most frequent initial 
response to this question, given by proponents of incorporation, is 
"to gain local control"; but this response is too vague to be very 
helpful. Certainly, the creation of an autonomous, authoritative 
local government is undertaken in order to ensure that local rather 
than nonlocal interests will control decision -- but which decisions? 
What aspect of municipal government is so vital that some individuals 
will donate hundreds of hours a year, for as long as ten years, to 
ensure that the local community becomes incorporated rather than 
annexed? 
While the actors in an incorporation drama speak in terms 
of local control, economists tend to give the rationale and justifica-
tion for local government in terms of efficieqcy. As Mancur Olson 
showed in Logic of Collective Action, public goods do not get provided 
at optimal levels to large, unorganized groups (1965). He elaborated 
further in the American Economic Review that, for efficiency's sake, 
the boundaries of the jurisdiction organized to provide a public good 
should roughly coincide with the limits of the population consuming that 
public good. 
Only if there are several levels of government and a 
large number of jurisdictions can immense disparities 
between the boundaries of jurisdiction and the boundaries 
of collective goods be avoided. There is a case for 
every type of institution from the international governmeni 
to the smallest.local government (1969: 486). 
The efficiency case for local governments was alsolmatte 
by Tiebout (1957), Oates (1972) and Bish (1971), who recognized 
differences in individual levels of demand for public goods. I S�nce 
s 
t 
21! 
there is normally only one level of public goods provision per 
jurisdiction, all those individuals who would prefer a diffele�t 
level of public goods provision suffer "conformity costs", ull 
they can leave that jurisdiction and join (or create) a difflr 
one, meeting their different tastes. Thus, the argument goel, 
jurisdictional fragmentation and diversity serve the purpose o 
allocational efficiency by increasing the range of individual oice., 
and reducing conformity costs. 
This view of the creation of new municipalities is I sujpporti" 
by a 1952 study of municipal incorporation in Los Angeles Coen 
This book found that, because the level of services provided t 
unincorporated communities by the county was so poor, the majo 
for incorporation up until that time was the provision of an o 
level of public goods, roads, sewers, water, property protecticjn, 
rea, , 
timaJ i 
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and regulation of nuisanc� (Bigger and Kitchen, 1952: 81). Redistri-
butional reasons for incorporation entered in only marginally, if 
at all. 
My own study of municipal incorporation in the same 
county since 1954, however, suggests a completely different inter-
pretation. The level of county services had improved greatly by 
the 1950s. However, due to energetic annexation campaigns by the older 
cities, urbanizing communities had to choose between annexation 
and incorporation. They overwhelmingly chose incorporation under 
the Lakewood Plan, not as a way of guaranteeing better public services, 
but as a way of avoiding property taxation. By incorporating around 
revenue resources, by zoning out costly land uses, by eliminating 
bureaucratic overhead, municipal incorporations have been reactions 
to the bureaucratic and redistributional activities of the older 
cities. The economic interpretation of municipal incorporation 
must rest on redistributional, rather
.
that efficiency concepts. 
MOTIVATIONS FOR INCORPORATION 
This paper will begin with a survey of the motivations for 
incoi:pui:ation in Los Angeles County since 1954, and continue with an 
economic analysis of these motivations. 
Local Control of Land Use Decisions 
In an important study.of land-use politics in suburban 
Long Island, Gottdiener (1977) has shown that three factors contributed 
to a pattern of zoning variances and other land use decisions 
I 
that resulted in "planned sprawl" rather than efficient landi !use. 
These three factors were (1) weak local political machines 
I
n edingl 
substantial contributions for reelection campaigns; (2) cont° ol II: over l®d �e deei•io� as the =ly •=ree of dimetio=J oliel 
available to politicians for use as an incentive for contr�b· tionki
and (3) developers who are highly interested in land use dlc · sion]I 
as make-or-break factors for their firms' success. Where bh' se 
factors occurred together on Long Island, the local politib� i 
organizations obtained the essential campaign contributionb, .  l and 
developers got their essential zoning variances in a mutua!l.l 
11, beneficial exchange, the only problem being the resulting �e ilitcl, on 
of the urban planning process and "planned sprawl·" II [ 
These three factors certainly occur together in pa ts of 
"" Angeleo co�ty, and lead ro o= of <he mo<iva'1=• fo, � ieil 
incorporation: residential dissatisfaction with zoning vii nces l l 1 
and other land use decisions that: lead to "planned sprawl"! a d eni:l"'nger 
I ii'"" land values in exclusive neighborhoods. Los Angeles Count� 
since the Progressive Era, been notable for the weakness ,f 
political organizations, and the county supervisors must anri 
costly reelection campaigns in supervisorial districts of lat 
and one-half million citizens each. Developers are highll c 
and especially anxious to build on the highly lucrative coas 
The most desirable of these undeveloped coastal areas is Jhe 
Verdes Peninsula, in south-west Los Angeles County, 
egul� I 
Iii� 
:::·� mpeti 
1 a ar 
Palos! 
.ve, 
s. 
Much of the peninsula was undeveloped and unincdrprrateCI' 
in the mid-fifties, when the principle land-owner, Great Jak s C�bbn 
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Corporation, began selling land to builders under a county zoning 
plan that would restrict development along the coast and keep housing 
densities down. The two small, existing developments on the peninsula 
incorporated as Rolling Hills and Rolling Hills Estates soon after. 
The newly arriving home-owners on the rest of the peninsula began 
to be uneasy when builders soon began petitioning for and receiving 
zoning variances that threatened to emasculate the plan. Between 
1960 and 1968, forty-eight zoning variances were sought by developers, 
all of which were fought before the county board of supervisors 
by neighborhood home-owners' associations. The home-owners lost 
every fight. In 1965, the Palos Verdes Peninsula Advisory Council 
was created as a federation of neighborhood associations, in the hope 
that unity would give more political strength before the county board. 
The Council had no better luck with the board, but, with 80 percent 
of the developable land already developed, began to revise the 1955 
plan, making concessions to developers' interest, but maintaining 
a commitment to the 1961 school board projections of a peninsula-
wide population of 140, 000. This figure was 22, 000 more than the 1969 
population. 
However, the developers secretly J;.3repared an alternate 
plan, projecting a peninsula-wide developed population of 140, 000 
double the 1969 population. The 70,000 additional people, according 
to this plan, would live primarily in multi-family dwellings in 
the remaining small fraction of developable land, mainly along 
the coast. When this secret plan was leaked to the public, the 
Palos Verdes Council began immediate plans for incorporation. In 
a hard-fought battle with the developers involving 
�hree years of controversy and maneuvering, Rancho 
was incorporated. 
Not only zoning 
zoning plans is held in low regard by home-owners in 
territory. At the time of Carson's incorporation in 
were 96 wrecking yards in the community, half of them 
the county's zoning ordinance. The campaign literature 
incorporation proclaimed why local control of land use was 
to the home-owners of Carson: 
We all know what has been happening to our community 
because we haven't had a voice or local control over 
development of our area. The people in 
who have been deciding our future for us, could care 
about what happens to us or our families. 
Ten years after incorporation, there were only twenty-four 
yards in Carson. (Ironically, however, the author of this 
literature, along with several other city councilmen and 
mental commissioner were indicted, convicted, and sent to 
charges of bribery and soliciting bribes. Evidently the 
were not always impervious to the problems that helped to 
incorporation.) 
Discontent with county land-use was felt in a 
cities around the county, and incorporation as a small, 
7 
suburb, controlled by home-owner interests, seemed the most satisfactory 
answer. Of course, this kind of fragmentation of land use control 
is little better as a solution to the problem of urban sprawl than 
is county planning corrupted by special interest or indifference. 
Control of Rancho Palos Verdes by home-owners simply means that the 
apartment builders and wrecking yards move to the next best place; 
it certainly doesn't prevent strip development, inefficient land 
use, development in flood plains, blight, or other problems in 
the rest of the country, it simply relocates them. But for our 
purposes, it is sufficient to note that municipal incorporation was 
the solution to land use problems perceived by local home-owners. 
Local Control of the Tax Base 
For a different set of cities, the motivation for incorporation 
was protection of the resource base. The City of Industry, for instance, 
was incorporated in 1957 along 18 miles of Southern Pacific and Union 
Pacific Railroad track. It was just wide enough to protect a large 
proportion of the county's industry from municipal property taxation 
in perpetuity, but not wide enough to have more than 700 residents. 
Irwindale was incorporated by the gravel companies that owned the 
great San Gabriel Valley pits that were supplying the postwar 
construction of freeways. The incorporation of Commerce guaranteed 
a high per capita sales tax revenue for the citizens and no municipal 
property taxation for the industry and commerce located within 
its boundaries. For a decade, Carson managed to fight off acquisitive 
annexation policies from Long Beach, which coveted Carson's oil 
property and fine location for industry. South El Monte, Cerritos, 
11!11 
al, 
Santa Fe Springs, Palmdale, and Downey similarly chose jud�cious 
boundaries around areas of high resources or growth potentJal 
�11 i The Problematic Case of Low Resource, High Density Incorpo�at 
The exclusive residential cities which incorporadedlto 
protect their land values through zoning decisions, and thJ c 
industrial cities which incorporated to protect their rich lta 
quickly established themselves as going concerns. Togethe,, 
accounted for everyone of 12 newly incorporated cities witH p 
assessments of over $3,000 in 1970, plus Walnut and La MirJda
ds s 
But there are eighteen other cities in the centrJ1 �asin 
vhioh am, in Che vord• of one eo®cy official, "coo •�11 �· coo 
poor " to keep their heads above water during difficult peri 
a• 'he early aevencie•. Hawaii� Garde� va• m�'ioned a• � 
problem city. Located between Long Beach and Orange Count!, :it 
already developed when it incorporated in 1964, and thus didrift 
ineorpora'e Co maincain an exeluaive, aemirural environm�� - ! IC 
was a low-income area and so didn't incorporate to keep ou:1 t e poo 
1' had no rich c= baae capable of •upplying high per eapie,a tni! 
levels at low tax rates. What possible motivation did this! atP.d otJ 
sucRI 
was 
I 
I 
similar cities have for incorporation? Were they acting inl sdime Iii 
ethiJ noneconomic way that can only be explained by reference to sci 
like "community pride?" What did these cities want with loba: 
The explanation does not rest with the necessity bf 
atlon as a means of providing local services. Even if they1w 
discontented with county services, as communities early in l:l-i 
Iii�,. con� 1 1.,l? 
l.nCOll;, Jr-
11 re ' cen �y 
I 
I 
had been, they had the alternative of annexation, which looked, on 
the face of it, like a good economic bargain. The city of Lakewood, 
for instance, resisted annexation to Long Beach, an oil-rich city 
that was featured in a 1952 Saturday Evening Post as "The City with 
Too Much Money," a recreational shangri-la with money to burn 
(January 12, 1952: 70-76). Long Beach had a higher tax base, and 
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was composed of a more diverse population with a higher median home 
value than Lakewood, which yet insisted on incorporating in 1954. 
In 1960, the citizens of Long Beach were getting the benefit of $110 
per capita of municipal services, with a tax bill of only $49 for 
the median home-owner. The citizens of Lakewood, on the other hand, 
got a return of only $26 worth of services per capita for their 
median tax bill of $18. Had the citizens of Lakewood made an economic 
miscalculation when they incorporated? Weren1t they getting a worse 
deal than the citizens of Long Beach? 
If they had made a mistake, they had plenty of company. 
The citizens of at least a dozen other cities refused annexation 
to cities with much better tax bases, where their tax dollars, dollar 
for dollar, would have been converted into a higher level of services 
One possible explanation is that of the public choice 
theorists, who argue that new cities incorporate in order to supply 
a different mixture of services to people with different sets of 
tastes. "Families with a similar tastes locate together, and often, 
incorporate as a municipality to preserve their selective residential 
environment. " (Bish, 1971: 137). This argument receives some support 
from the Lakewood case; although Lakewood had a poorer tax base than 
Ill 
1t ! 
Long Beach, and although the citizens couldn't count on halin 
money spent on its park department, Long Beach did not have a 
program supplying activities in its parks on an active, cojti 
basis. And according to one of the founders of Lakewood, Jh� 
a key ommission; the Lakewood incorporators emphasized a mjlt 
dollar recreational program as a central part of their incdrp 
as l'IJl:h 
recr��tion 
! 
uingllf 
was11I 
I 
-mi
t��r
n 
ra i.c 
! 
· d. d h d h · f ·1·  campaign, irecte at t e young veterans an t eir ami ies who 
had settled in Lakewood. And after incorporation, the LakJw6 d 
leruler• chreaceoed co hold up rooiog deoi•i� requ�ced b, '. velo�ll i ['rs 
=cil chey goc dooacioM of Umd for parks. Theae '-"�'; erh• : : 1 
help explain why Lakewood was getting a better recreation Jro ram I � 
less money than Long Beach was spending. 
The Continuing Case of Low-Resource, High-Density Cities 
It is possible to make a convincing case for the 
[ choice explanation of incorporation by looking at Lakewood! : cco�l·��pg 
co chia expl�aci�, che Lokewood inhabicanca were aocing 1•C"ooa�
.
l �i l 
because the lower expenditure per capita in Lakewood generate by �:re 
!ill poorer tax base was worth more than the higher expenditure pe calM 
in Long Beach, in that it was directed at the particular tast s o:fillllttlhe 
Lakewood inhabitants. 
ich fol 
explanation of behavior does not seem to hold. There l arf ma1� 
cities which were even poorer than Lakewood, and which cou:tdnl ' t 0£11 
the m�� 
verJll 
I 
However, there are still several problem comrnunittie 
tlii s 
of public services that they could afford seemed inferior 
their inhabitants an excellent recreation program; in fact 
way to that of the cities to which they could be annexed. 
For example, Paramount, Bellflower, and Hawaiian Gardens 
surrounded Long Beach with even smaller tax bases than Lakewood's. 
Their budgets do not reveal that these citizens had any "special 
tastes" for public goods, like Lakewood's taste for recreation. 
What little money they had went for the same public services being 
supplied in greater quantity in Long Beach. Nor was incorporation 
in these cities a matter of protecting suburbs from the evils of 
big city-hood. Despite the fact that Paramount was spending only 
one-third as much per capita on law enforcement, it had a crime 
rate in 1972 of 684 per thousand inhabitants to Long Beach's 519. 
The economic explanation that remains is that these 
11 
communities sought local control, not of zoning power, not of a rich 
tax base, but of the tax rate decision. The motivation for incorpora-
tion in these problematic cities was protection from the high property 
tax rates of the potentially annexing cities. 
Part of the evidence for this explanation is in Table 1. 
The cities of Bell, El Monte, Long Beach, Monrovia, Azusa, and 
Whittier (as well as Torrance and West Covina, not shown) were 
engaging in vigorous annexation campaigns during the forties, fifties, 
and sixties. In fact, the period of most intensive incorporation 
activity, 1954-1964, was also the perio"d of most rapid annexation by 
these older cities. During six of these eleven years, more unincorporated 
land was annexed by older cities than was incorporated into new ones. 
Over-all, from 1950 to 1970, 192 square miles were annexed, while a total 
of only 156 square miles were incorporated. 
of the 
1. In 
1:j 
H ! 
Ir I: i 
1111 l! 
I 
(Table 1 goes about here) I Iii 
I 
The cities that incorporated in the immediate neighb: rhood l!� 111 
annexing cities are shown beneath the annexing city ii : able 111 
every case, the new city incorporated with a much lowlr 
rate than that available in the city threatening annexation. 
was true of exclusive residential cities like Bradbury and La 
it was true of commercial cities like Industry and Irwindalel 
"radJ I 
' 
it was also true of lower-class cities with weak tax bases l�k 
Paramount and Hawaiian Gardens. (It was also true for otherl dew 
incorporations not shown in the table. ) The maintenance of [Lo; 
municipal property tax rates, in response to a threat of annbx tionW 
wao che co-n d=omioacor of Lak�ood Plan incorporacioM. I While other motivations for incorporation, like regu ation 
of land use, motivated at least the leaders in incorporatioJ m veme�Wf 
the most basic and pervasive motive for incorporation was tJe
. 
void��ee 
I II! of high property taxation. Every incorporation campaign with: hich i 
I am familiar emphasized the commitment to low property taxjs; 
where the leaders were unable to convince the electorate thJt:lhe 
city would be viable without high property taxation, the injor . • ora+ 
would fail at the polls, as it did in the exclusive coastal lei y ofll 1 
Malibu in 1976. 
The commitment to low property tax rates ·was maintiai 
I years a 
subJde 
tax nat 
a real, rather than symbolic manner. In 1970, several 
duel between incorporation and annexation had begun to 
one of the 45 prewar cities still had sizable property 
ed iJ 
ter it 
alllll,-
111  s ov.e 
I 
t 
$.50. 
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TABLE 1 
TAX RATES FOR ANNEXING AND INCORPORATING CITIES 
Bell 
Bell Gardens 
Cudahy 
Commerce 
El Monte 
Baldwin Park 
South El Monte 
Rosemead 
Temple City 
Long Beach 
Bellflower 
Hawaiian Gardens 
Lakewood 
Paramount 
Carson 
Monrovia 
Azusa 
Bradbury 
Duarte 
Irwindale 
Whittier 
Industry 
La Mirada 
Santa Fe Springs 
Pico Rivera 
Geographic Cluster 
Year of 
Incorporation 1960 Tax Rate 
1927 
1961 
1960 
1960 
1912 
1956 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1897 
1957 
1964 
1954 
1957 
1968 
1887 
1898 
1957 
1957 
1957 
1898 
1957 
1960 
1957 
1958 
1.43 
None 
. 97 
. 13 
None 
None 
1.37 
None 
None 
. 53 
. 20 
None 
1. 76 
1.45 
. 97 
.16 
None 
1.50 
None 
.49 
.55 
��=��=-���-������= 
1970 Tax Rate 
1. 29 
None 
None 
None 
. 87 
1.31 
None 
None 
None 
1. 52 
None 
None 
. 08 
None 
None 
1.58 
1.45 
.58 
None 
None 
. 82 
None 
None 
.49 
None 
�=-.::w- --====---==---== 
But in the same year all 
tax rates less than that 
a high-income suburb and 
but eight of the thirty-two new citi1s hadl 
fig"re. On1y <wo miden<ial oH+ one 
one a low-income suburb, had allowed the , 
Iproperty tax rate to creep up to $1. 00. 
I ;l Ill This does not mean that expenditures were always !lo in t 
In cities where a lot of revenue was genekl'l ed Ill postwar cities. 
automatically by sales tax revenue or from federal or state! giants�I Ill 
a great deal of money was spent. Industry spent over $2, 077 i er 
capita on its several hundred.inhabitants, without a propeTil'ty 
But there were 12 cities which spent less than $49 per cap�ta 
fiscal year 1971: none of these cities raised any money tJro
property taxation. If doing without property taxation meajt 
$33 per capita, as in the elite suburb of Hidden Hills, or 1$3 
capita, as in the low-income city of Cudahy, then that is tih� ' ' 
of money that would be spent. Regardless of income class, it? 
cities' rule for expenditures was "spend everything you earl g I ' 
a property tax." 
tax . 
in 
gh 
pendti 
"I  
per11I 
amo_1 1 
ne1 ! 
t w�t 
l 
ut 
Notice that this rule is more than simple price ela 
of demand, in which less is demanded as the price increaseJ. 
· · - · l"k insistence on near-zero property tax rates is i e a consumer1 
 
,,J 
The 111:
.
� I 
who 1J l�l 
take everything that is free, but nothing that costs anyth�ng -a 11f 
I 
very severe form of price elasticity indeed . 
The implication of this behavior for the study ef: l ocali 
I , governments is very important. The only economic explanatiohl for l�diV.er 
half of the incorporations in Los Angeles County since 1954 �s 
there was a sizeable group of individuals who didn't want _ ol 
to local governments that would tax them in order to provide them 
local services. So far as these individuals were concerned, Long 
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Beach, Whittier, El Monte, and the other older cities were supplying 
something they didn't want to buy. This raises some serious questions. 
Are municipally supplied goods nearly worthless, that so many individuals 
would rather do without than be taxed for them? Are municipally 
supplied goods extremely over-supplied in the older cities, and if 
so, why? What could explain a combination of ever-growing expenditures 
in the established cities, and an emphatic refusal to buy in the new 
municipalities? 
To answer these questions, I feel it is necessary to consider 
both bureaucratic behavior, and the redistributional implications 
of new incorporations. 
THE SCALE OF GOVERNMENT IN OLD AND NEW CITIES 
Old cities tax, and new cities don't. In fact, the new 
cities in Los Angeles were created precisely and primarily to escape 
property taxation. 
The difference between the two kinds of cities is evident 
in Table 2. The scale of government (as given by the ratio of 
municipal expenditures to total tax assessments) is much larger in 
the old-line cities than the new cities, both in 1960 and in 1970; 
furthermore, the scale of government was growing during the period, 
most significantly in the areas of general government and public 
safety. Los Angeles spent on public safety a figure that 
was 1.7 percent of the tax base in 1960, and 2.7 percent in 
I i:I It spent on general government an amount that was 1.3 percin of 
tax base in 1960 and 2.5 percent of the tax base on general 
in 1970. 
(Table 2 goes about here) 
Why have the budgets of these older cities grownl
: 
One 
Ill explanation is gradual bureaucratic expansion due to politic1 1 pre: 
 I from employees of public agencies, the ·inability to determin: the 
efficacy of public moneys spent on many urban problems, ank · ncrem 
in budgeting. The inexorable, incremental nature of budgeba' 
Y 111 I I i expansion is borne out by data on the growth in municipal fi e and: 
police budgets, between 1950 and 1970. . 1 11 111 While price leve s f creas1 
by 2.13 times during 
increased over three 
this period, police expenditures per e:� ita I 
times as fast, and fire expenditures lt ost I 
In Long B�eh, poliee �d fire expendl; ree 
I per capita increased over four times as fast as inflation. I . 
four times as fast. 
Why have the citizens of these older cities allowe 
budget growth? One possible answer is that increased budglt 
viewed as being the result of each city getting a bigger sh<\ 
the federal and state aid pie. But if budgets were growijg 
 
of federal and state aid, the property tax rates would eioh� 
or x <ay che x�e. H�ever, fo Lox Angelox, regrminn r+1 
that tax rates have increased by an average of S percent a, y 
controlling for changes in property assessments, and that lir\ 
6 
t 
ure 
talism 
se 
st 
Table 2 
TOTAL MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURES AS A PRECENT OF TOTAL ASSESSMENTS, 
1960 AND 1970 
0- 1.0- 2.0- 3.0- 4.0- 5.0-
1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 
6.0% + 
Prewar cities - 1 6 (1960) 20 17 1 
Postwar cities 5 (1960) 6 
9 1 
Prewar cities - 1 3 6 17 8 10 (1970 
Postwar cities 1 4 9 (1970) 
14 2 1 1 
17 
Total 
45 
21 
45 
32 
in assessments have gone at least partly towards increased pro ertx: 
I • tax revenue rather than tax relief.1 As a result, tax rates wl=nt 
from $1. 85 in 1950 to $2. 88 in 1977. Tax rates followed a li' 
pattern in most other older cities, rising from $1.19 in LlnW Beac 
to $2.70 in 1977. The question becomes more narrowly focusld'as 
"Why do populations allow budget growth that results in prole' 
· 1ar 
t 
rate increases?" 
THE REDISTRIBUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF OLD AND NE1v CITIES 
Having begun by examining the motivations for new 
I
i corpo<" 
tions, the problem has become one of comparison of old and ne citJl
finme» The ,;,e nf "e budgec. in "e older oitie• her.le� ev1 
more interesting in combination with the observation that mln cipa]J 
supplied servic:s seem to be crowdable, "private" goods, whlc: I
could in theory by more efficiently provided by market mechL:. ms I 
rather than public bureaucracies (see Bergstrom and Goodman !
Why are tax rates increased to provide larger budgets, to inbrease 
public supplies of private goods? 
The answer is suggested by a model developed by eeo' omist1� 
Bushanan and Spann (Bushanan, 1971; Spann, 1975). This modll1 showJ I 
that under certain situations, a majority of the population m : prJ 1 
to hnve private goods inefficiently but collectively supplied � ThJ
reason for this is redistributional; the cost-sharing implilitl in 
collective provision of a good at a uniform level makes it Jo� ible 
for lower classes to get more of the good at the expense of sp sid�­
from "" uppec-inrome da'"'· Ahhough the lower inrome indf idJ� 
would be experiencing what has been called "conformity cost�"! ecaJI� 
I 
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of collective provision of the good at a uniform level, they would 
be better off enduring these conformity costs than privately consuming 
a lesser amount of the good determined by their private budget constraint. 
If the median voter's tax share is less than the market 
price, then the aggregate collective consumption would be greater 
than aggregate private consumption. Thus, through majority rule, the 
private good could be consumed collectively, and at greater aggregate 
levels.2 
There is reason to think that in Los Angeles County, 
this model could go far to explain the discrepancy between the 
high budget levels of the established cities and low budget levels 
of the new cities. 
Demand for municipal expenditures can be estimated by 
replicating the Bergstrom-Goodman regression analysis for 1970 
expenditures in the 70 Los Angeles County cities with populations 
greater than 2,500. The Bergstrom and Goodman analysis, like the 
Buchanan-Spann model, assumes that local expenditures are supplied 
at a level demanded by the median voter, and that the individual 
demand is a function of median tax shares (T), median family income 
(I), and municipal population (N). (Median tax share is operationalized 
as the median home value divided by total property in the municipality.) 
Results of estimation of this model by means of a double log regression, 
are in Table 3. 
(Table 3 goes about here) 
As formulated by Bergstrom and Goodman, municipal population 
I 
Table 3 
ESTIMATES OF DEMAND FOR MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURES, 1970 
I i 
Income 
Elasticity (s) 
Tax share Co) 
elasticity 
Population (y ( l + o))elasticity 
Crowding term (y) 
k 
R2 
F 
Income ( elasticity s) 
Tax s�ai;e (o) elasticity 
Populat�on ( (1 + o)) elasticity Y 
Home-�w�ership(a.) elasticity 
Crowding term (y) 
k 
R2 
F 
.-..,.--::-::--.......=.-:::..;::_-=--=---=-- ·- - ·-
Exp = kisToP y (1 + o) 
Police Streets 
.29 .35 
( .18) ( .27) 
-.60* -.51* 
( .08) (.12) 
.52* .56* 
( .08) ( .12) 
1.3 1.14 
1. 70 .76 
.91 .81 
225.9 91.3 
Exp = kisToP y (1 + o)Ha. 
·-
Police Streets 
.78* .55 
( .18) (. 31) 
* -.51* -.60 
(.07) (.12) 
* .56 * .52 
( .07) ( .12) 
-.62* -.24 
( .12) (. 21) 
1.3 1.14 
.21 .33 
.94 .81 
241.0 69.15 
.- -=-==-==-=-==:::o====-
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enters into the demand function both because of its "crowding" effect 
'£. · and because greater population decreases the tax share cost to 
the individual, depending on both the crowding effect and the tax 
share elasticity. Together, the observed population elasticity a 
is equal to T(o + 1), and the crowding parameter is estimated as 
a/l - o. With this estimation, police, parks, and streets are crowdable 
goods, as are over-all municipal expenditures. 
But further, demand for these municipally supplied goods 
is highly elastic with respect to tax share and income, as suggested 
by the above models. As income goes up, demand increases, but as 
tax share increases, demand decreases. The conditions for redistribu-
tional provision of municipal goods are met. Middle-class families 
with a large investment in their homes will prefer to have less 
municipal provision of the goods. 
But renters do not directly pay the property tax, and may be 
subject to "fiscal illusion, " in that they do not perceive that the 
property taxes paid by their landlords are passed on to them, or they 
may not be as aware of the size of the property tax on the property, 
as is the landlord who actually pays it. In either case, they would 
demand more municipal services than they would if they owned similar 
property. Therefore, demand for expenditures may increase with the 
likelihood that the median voter is suffering from fiscal illusion. 
The proportion of home-owners in the municipality is taken as a proxy 
for this variable. 
As can be seen from Table 3, this variable adds significantly 
to the analysis of local government expenditures, and in the right 
direction. As the probability that the median voter is a home�owne 
increases, demand for municipal expenditures decreases shaJl�!· 
What does all this have to do with the creation of l tJe La��W.ood 
Plan cities? These cities were created as an early manifesta 
of the tax revolt which has become most evident since passaiel 
Proposition 13 in June of 1978. For home-owners, who do noh 
from fiscal illusion with regard to property taxation, the br 
of property tax indicates, "You're not getting someone else pay 
for municipal services." But lacking this redistributional l a,dvant 
there is no reason for essentially private goods to be supp!l.fed 
I . collectively. Police protection can be partially replaced by .•·1mean 
of dogs, automatic alarms, fences, guns, and maintenance of a high� 
income neighborhood. Fire protection can be provided volunta ily, I as it is in La Habra Heights. Parks and recreation can be �r vide •1o<$ o� by means of back-yard tennis courts and swimming pools. 
be purchased rather than taken from the library. The Lakewood! Pla 
minimal cities were created, not for reasons of efficiency, ! but 
as a way out for property owners who didn't want to pay form 
· · f · · · d d bl· 1 f d ·  · provision o private services, provi e pu ic y or re istri 
reasons, and institutionally nurtured by bureaucratic budgJt 
nici 
utio 
incrementalism. 
Evidence for this interpretation can be garnered oy' f stu 
of home ownership in Los Angeles municipalities. In 1960, ev ry d 
but one of the low-resource, "problem" incorporations were ma·oriJ 
home-owning cities. Between 1960 and 1970, home-ownership l inl the 
county as a whole dropped dramatically, hut those individuals! who 
were home-owners continued to be attracted to the Lakewood I Pllan cilli!llles. 
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By 1970, only 45 percent of the habitations in the cities with tax rates 
of over $1, 000 were owner-occupied. But, despite the suburban 
apartment boom of the late sixties, owner-occupancy rates stayed 
at 60 percent in the low tax rate cities. Thus, as predicted by 
Tiebout, there was a gradual sorting out of the Los Angeles County 
population, with home-owners comprising the majority in the minimal, 
low tax-rate suburbs, and renters comprising an increasing majority 
in the large-scale, high tax-rate cities. 
The Effect of Bureaucratic Incrementalism 
There is something of a contradiction within this paper 
which I feel it is incumbent upon me to resolve. Earlier in the 
paper, I suggested that budgets, at least in the older cities, increased 
in an irresistible, incremental way. That the newer cities are not 
immune to budget incrementalism is shown by increases in their scale of 
operation, shown in Table 2. On the other hand, I used the Bergstrom 
and Goodman mode of analysis which assumes that the median voter's 
level of demand is authoritative, and that bureaucratic pressure for 
budget expansion can be ignored. 
One way to reconcile the Bergstrom and Goodman analysis 
with bureaucratic supply is to examine the residuals. If older, 
more bureaucratic cities are politically immune from voter demand, this 
should be evident in discrepancies between actual expenditures and those 
predicted by the demand model. Figure 1 shows the ratio of the 
residual expenditure to demand for municipal expenditure, graphed over 
year of incorporation. Expenditures beyond those predicled by the_ 
demand model increase with city age. The best-fitting 
which explains over one-quarter of the variation in 
shows that expenditures increase an additional ·7.4 
demand for every ten years of age. (Standard error ["' 
is 1.5 percent. The F ratio for the regression is 25. 7) 
[Figure 1 goes about here.] 
CONCLUSIONS: MOBILIZATION OF BIAS VS. INSTITUTIONALIZAT!ONIOF Bill 
The above analysis suggests that municipally suppl{ed 
services are crowdable, market-like goods, and that the eW amsio 
of collective provision of these services in old-line citli�$ is 
undertaken for redistributional and bureaucratic reasons. 
individuals, especially if they are renters, feel that e�a 
services may provide them with more of the service than bhe 
afford on their own private budget constraints. While tJes 
may not be political activists, the political "push" for 
expansion is provided in a natural, institutionalized wa� 
ow-ii. � 
·:::li 
inJllll 
s 
bud 
I 
incrementalism in bureaucratic agencies. Because of this[, 'ib 
is left to those who are hurt by this redistributional �ct}vity 
to express their dissatisfaction as best they can. 
me 
duals 
I 
As Hirschmann, has written, when faced with unsttisfa�Hpry . . . . . . . . I , . II nrganuacrnnal behavinc an rndmd=l can exprn" h1' dir ",l, on 
by "exiting" the organization or by "voicing" his disapp,mrlll 
to the organization (1970). Voice, in order to be effectiv 
requires the organization of like-minded individuals in jn 
voice is therefore drjma�ic, effort to change the institution; 
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sudden, and conflictual. The voice of middle-class frustration 
with the redistributional expansion of local services was articulated 
in this dramatic way by the Jarvis campaign against property taxation 
earlier this year. Few would doubt the essentially redistributional 
nature of this conflict. In the landslide election, 72 percent 
of the property owners voted for the "American dream" of the single 
family home, while renters voted against the Jarvis Amendment (only 
47 percent yes votes). The middle-class families with incomes between 
$15 and $25 thousand were the strongest supporters. 
Schattschneider called this style of politics the "mobil­
ization of bias" (1960). This is an accurate description of the 
politics of voice. But not all redistributional conflicts are 
as dramatic as those characterized by vocal, organized, electoral 
campaigns. Other redistributional conflicts are quieter, and involve 
individuals acting as individuals within a given institutional 
context, rather than in groups to change the institutional context. 
They may involve just as much of an interest bias and conflict, 
but without the organized mobilization, and therefore these 
conflicts may be called instances of "institutional bias". This 
paper has identified two cases of conflicting institutional bias 
in Los Angeles politics. The first is the natural, institutionalized 
expansion of bureaucratic budgets in old-style municipalities. 
Without any organized campaigns or hullabaloo, municipal budgets 
expand in a manner that is redistributionally biased in the favor 
of city officials and low income groups. 
The incorporation of Lakewood Plan cities 
a counter-vailing form of institutional bias. The 
class individuals from old-line cities to the new 
again a case of individuals acting in a rational, 
way within the context of established institutions, 
had a redistributional bias. These cities 
havens from the redistributional expansion 
just as the Jarvis Amendment was intended to do for 
a whole. Also like the Jarvis Amendment, 
class individuals had detrimental effects on bureaucrats 
lower-class and minority individuals. These individuals 
more concentrated in the old-line cities 
of urban crisis: crime, blight, and unemployment (see 
On the other hand, retial firms, light industry, and 
tax values followed the middle-class to the suburbs. 
discrpeancy between the most pressing urban needs and 
productive urban resources increased. 
Although voice is widely recognized as 
redistributional, exit is often thought of , since 
as a means of increased allocational efficiency. 
Los Angeles seems to suggest otherwise. 
(the Jarvis Amendment) and exit (the migration to the 
cities), the politically relevant question is "Who shall 
helped, and whb hurt, by the organization of government 
ropolitan areas?" 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. The regression model used for this result was suggested to me by 
John Ferejohn. It assumes that property tax revenue in a year t 
is a constant proportion of property tax revenue in year t - 1. 
Since property tax revenue equals the tax rate times assessable 
property, the model can be rewritten as: 
(Tax rate)t = k (Tax 
property B 1 t -
a rate) t - 1  Assessable property t/assessable 
Double log regression estimates of this model, using Los Angeles 
city data from 1950-1976, gives k = 1.05. 
a = .99, and B = ;51. 
Alpha is not significantly different from one, so the linearity 
assumption is met in that respect, but beta is significantly less 
than minus one, so that not all of the increases in property 
assessments is used for a proportional decrease in tax rates. 
Controlling for changes in assessments, there is a constant 
5 percent increase in tax rates every year. 
2. For instance, in the accompanying graph, borrowed from Spann 
(1975), three individuals with different incomes have different 
demand schedules for some private good. At the market price 
(MP), the rich individual would buy more than the middle-class 
individual, who would buy more than the poor individual. However, 
with collective consumption of the private good, the 
determined by his tax share. 
balance, the three tax shares must equal three times 
price). Unless the taxing system is very regressive 
the low income individual's demand will increase under 
"price decrease," and the upper-income individual's 
will decrease under a perceived "price increase. " 
pictured in Figure 2, both the middle-class and 
individuals would be better off with the collective 
the good, and the per capita quantity 
voter rule, would be greater than the average bought 
private market institution. The rich 
off, subsidizing the price decrease for the other two 1nf11�1cma.i,..\!1; 
tR 
MP 
tM 
tp 
FIGURE :'1 
Price Individual Demand Quantities with Private 
and Collective Consumption 
DemandR 
\ 
Deman� 
Deman� 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ..... 
(from Spann, 1974: 67) 
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